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Progress in Federal Regulatory Policy,
1980-2000
Murray Weidenbaum

A sea change has occurred in public
attitudes toward government regulation in
the two decades since 1980. Like the state,
the federal regulatory apparatus has not
withered away. In some important dimensions, regulation has expanded substantially. Nevertheless, a fundamental shift
has occurred in the public policy process.
"Command and control" is no longer a
phrase used in polite company. Its place
has been taken by almost obligatory references to "the magic of the marketplace."
The proponents of regulation now feel
obliged to talk about costs as well as benefits, private as well as public sector alternatives, incentives and disincentives, and
thus to consider the disadvantages as well
as the advantages of this form of govemment intervention in the larger society.
Despite significant achievements, the
regulatory reform effort of the past two
decades seems to have run its course. A
new strategy is needed, one that focuses
greater attention on reducing the shortcomings of the basic regulatory statutes,
both to eliminate the barriers to agencies
doing regulatory analysis as well as to
reduce the discretion they often take in
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Figure 1

Figure 2

Staffing of Federal Regulatory Activity,
1970-2000
(Fiscal Years, Full-time Equivalent
Employment)

Spending on Federal Regulatory Activity,
1960-2000
(Fiscal Years, in Billions of
Constant 1992 Dollars)
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going beyond the role envisioned by Congress. Each congressional committee ought
to be required to present estimates of the
likely benefits and costs of regulatory actions necessary to implement proposed legislation. To improve the credibility of these
estimates, Congress should establish an
independent Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis staffed with experienced
apolitical analysts willing to let the chips
fall where they may.

In many regards, 1980 was a turning
point in government regulation. That year
the regulatory workforce of the federal government reached a new high. The total of
121,791 employees represented a steep
average annual rise of 5.8 percent from
1970 (see Figure 1). The next several years
witnessed the sharpest decline in the
employment of the federal regulatory agencies, at least in modern times. (Figure 2

shows a similar trend in another widely
used measure of regulatory activity, federal outlays for regulation.)
Substantive policy changes, in the
main, tended to follow a comparable trajectory. In the 1970s, Congress enacted a
plethora of new or expanded regulatory
programs covering consumer product
safety, antitrust, toxic substances, overseas bribery, energy, strip mining, minimum wages, debt collection, age discrimination, water pollution, noise pollution,
speed limits, campaign finance, product
warranties, employee pensions, drinking
water, hazardous materials, air pollution,
job safety, and credit cards.
In the latter part of the decade, the
stirrings of regulatory reform began to be
visible. Congress passed a landmark airline deregulation bill in 1978. In the area
of procedure, President Jimmy Carter
expanded the process of reviewing proposed regulations launched earlier in the
decade by President Gerald Ford.
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1980: A Watershed Year

The year 1980 was a period of transition. On the positive side, Congress eliminated much of the detailed apparatus of
railroad and trucking regulation. In addition, the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the
Paperwork Reduction Act were enacted.

Because it enjoys substantial
bipartisan support, centralized
regulatory review can be expected
to stay regardless of the outcome
of the elections in 2000.

also contributed to the subsequent financial collapse of the savings and loan associations (S&Ls).
In late 1980, presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan promised to rein in the
expansion of regulation, especially by requiring detailed cost-benefit analyses for
all new regulations. 2

Expectations and Reality

The regulatory flexibility statute was
perfunctory. Although it nominally required rulemaking agencies to write regulations in a manner that would minimize
the burdens on small business, actual
compliance has been minimal. The paperwork law, which took effect in 1981, turned
out to be a sleeper. It established the
Office of Information and Regulatory Mfairs
(OIRA), the part of the Office of Management and Budget that carries out the centralized regulatory reviews mandated by
President Reagan and continued by his
successors.' Because it enjoys substantial
bipartisan support, centralized regulatory
review can be expected to stay regardless
of the outcome of the elections in 2000.
Not all change on the regulatory front
in 1980 represented progress. That year,
Congress also created Superfund, a monument to the encouragement of costly litigation as a deterrent to environmental
cleanup. The partial banking deregulation
law enacted in 1980 produced a mixed bag
of results. Phasing out interest rate ceilings was a direct move to a more competitive financial system. However, the change

At the beginning of the 1980s, proponents of regulatory reform were enthusiastic. Mter years of massive expansions of
the federal regulatory apparatus, at long
last the tide would turn. Events in early
1981 surely seemed to confirm that expectation. Newly-elected President Reagan
quickly eliminated energy price and allocation controls and the vestige of "voluntary" wage and price controls of the past.
In the February 18, 1981 message outlining his supply-side economic program,
President Reagan listed regulatory reform
as one of the four key components. Fulfilling his campaign pledge , he issued a key
executive order requiring federal agencies
to demonstrate that the benefits of proposed new r e gulations exceeded their
costs. President Reagan also charged OIRA
with the responsibility to enforce this requirement. At the same time, he established a high -level Regulatory Relief Task
Force chaired by the vice president to oversee the entire regulatory reform effort.
In many ways, results were very heartening. As noted earlier, the size of the federal regulatory establishment was curtailed
for several years. Further, the regulatory
review process instituted by President
Reagan had a substantial impact. Although
only a small proportion of the thousands
of regulations reviewed by OMB was returned or withdrawn, the threat of such
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severe action often motivated substantial
changes, including deferring some regulatory initiatives.
Several deregulatory statutes were enacted, such as the Bus Regulatory Reform
Act of 1982 and the Shipping Act of 1984.
The most significant accomplishment was
so undramatic that it went unnoticed: during the Reagan presidency-and unlike
other administrations in recent decadesno new regulatory agency was established
nor was any major regulatory program substantially expanded. It was reminiscent of
the Sherlock Holmes tale where the most
significant clue was not action at all, but
the fact that the dog did not bark.

The most significant accomplishment of the 1980s was so
undramatic that it went unnoticed:
during the Reagan presidency
no new regulatory agency was
established nor was any major
regulatory program substantially
expanded.

The best available evidence on overall
regulatory cost is illustrated in Figure 3,
indicating that the aggregate burden of
regulation declined substantially in the late
1970s and early 1980s. This reduction is
attributable to significant economic deregulation of airlines, surface transportation, telecommunications, and financial
services. In the mid-1980s, this wave of
economic deregulation ended and the pace
of environmental regulation intensified.
Aggregate regulatory costs resumed their
upward climb.
6

Figure 3
Annualized Regulatory Costs, 1977-2000
(1995 dollars, in billions)
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Source: Thomas D. Hopkins, Regulatory Costs in
Profile (St. Louis: Washington University,
Center for the Study of American Business,
August 1996).

In the early 1980s, forecasts of regulatory doom and gloom were prevalent. The
critics thought that the green eye-shade
people in the Reagan administration were
so determined to grant business "regulatory relief' that they were oblivious to the
great damage that would be done to the
environment, workers' health, and other
vital social goals.
These dire forecasts did not come to
pass. By every important standard, the
environment is cleaner, the workplace is
safer, and substantial progress has been
made toward achieving the other goals at
which social regulations are aimed. The
major measures of workplace accidents
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are down significantly from 1979. Almost all of the pollutants for which the
Environmental Protection Agency has set
national standards show substantial declines in emissions from 1982. More ofthe
nation's rivers and lakes are now "fishable
and swimmable." Most fundamentally, the
average life span of Americans continues
to lengthen.
7

Moreover, the economic deregulation
that started in the late 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s has injected competition into the market economy with strongly
positive results. Costs and prices in the
deregulated industries have come down
while the pace of innovation has accelerated. The industries that have been or are
being gradually deregulated include airlines, railroads, trucking, fmancial services,
telecommunications, and utilities. These
results have had a profound and pervasive
influence in bringing down inflation, extending economic growth, and raising living standards. 3
However, progress on regulatory reform has not followed a straight line. The
restraint on enacting new or expanded
regulatory legislation weakened in the
mid-1980s. In 1986, Congress passed a
statute requiring removal of materials containing asbestos from school buildings.
(Horror stories quickly accumulated about
the illnesses caused by the resultant
movement into the air of hitherto dormant
asbestos products.) This was quickly followed by expansions of the statutes covering hazardous waste sites, age discrimination, and single employer pension plans.
In the late 1980s, Congress passed a
number of new regulatory statutes, among
them laws requiring advance notice of layoffs of 50 or more workers, a reauthorization of the nation's pesticide law, and massive new restrictions on S&Ls. Legislation
in the early 1990s included a huge expansion of EPA's authority to regulate air pollution, a new and draconian law goveming
oil tanker design, a new civil rights law, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and expansion of the enforcement powers of the SEC.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
gave employees a legal entitlement to take
extended leave while retainingjob reinstate8

ment rights. In few cases were the benefits
and costs of these new laws independently
estimated prior to enactment. No systematic evaluation has been conducted since.

Progress on regulatory refonn
has not followed a straight line.
The restraint on enacting new or
expanded regulatory legislation
weakened in the mid-1980s.

J
~

A variety of laws passed in the middle
and late 1990s continued the renewed
upward trend in regulatory enactments.
Examples include the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, the Food Quality Protection
Act of 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and the
National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996. 4 The federal regulatory agencies, especially EPA, responded with alacrity in generating another burst of rulemaking initiatives. These ranged from a
new "environmental justice" program to
toughened air quality standards (the former
lacked specific statutory justification while
the latter was devoid of adequate scientific
support).
Simultaneously, Congress has taken a
few important steps toward reducing the
burdens of government regulation. The
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted banks to set
up more interstate branches. In 1999, Congress voted to eliminate the wall separating banks and other financial institutions
that had been set up by the Glass-Steagall
Act of the 1930s. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 was intended to open up com9

petition for local telephone service. However, progress has been delayed, mainly by
the attempt of the Federal Communications
Commission to closely regulate the process
of deregulation. Also in 1996, the Interstate
Commerce Commission was abolished, but
its residual functions were transferred to
the new Surface Transportation Board.

,.

The regulatory reform effort
initiated in the late 1970s and
early 1980s has run out of
steam. What is needed is not a
renewal of the earlier effort, but
a shift in the basic thrust of
regulatory reform.

In 1993, the Clinton Administration
rescinded the existing executive orders on
regulatory review and replaced them with
a new one that reaffirmed OMB (via OIRA)
as the central agency charged with reviewing proposed regulations. On the surface,
the new executive order requires the regulatory agencies to do many sensible things
in the process of drafting rules, including
considering benefits and costs and identifying market-based alternatives for meeting governmental objectives.
In reviewing the actions under the
Clinton executive order, however, the General Accounting Office reported discouraging results in terms of substantive compliance. Experienced reviewers of federal
regulations note that the agencies are not
likely to comply seriously on a voluntary
basis and will only respond to stringent
judicial oversight and informed public pressure. 5 As an indicator of the shortcomings
10

of the current regulatory review process,
as of October 1998 the Competitive Enterprise Institute identified over 100 new
rules, each of which was estimated by federal agencies to cost over $100 million a
year. That is a costly pipeline of future
regulation. 6
Meanwhile, efforts to get Congress to
pass a generic or comprehensive regulatory reform law continue. Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, federal agencies are required to assess the
benefits and costs of new regulations that
impact significantly on state and local governments. Although the new law did not
outlaw these mandates, it may have slowed
down the creation of new ones. The same
year, however, the proposed Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act, which had
passed the House of Representatives, failed
in the Senate by one vote. The next year
Congress did enact the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,
which established a procedure for congressional review of major rules. So far, not a
single regulation has been overturned using
these new procedures.

The Need for Further
Regulatory Reform

I
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The regulatory reform effort initiated in
the late 1970s and early 1980s has run out
of steam. What is needed is not a renewal
of the earlier effort, but a shift in the basic
thrust of regulatory reform. Virtually all
proposals to date have focused on improving the way in which government agencies
write regulations to carry out laws already
enacted. Although this activity is useful, it
ignores the compelling fact that the key
decisions occur earlier in the process-when
Congress passes an Occupational Safety
and Health Act or an amendment to the
11

Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act or any other
important regulatory law, usually with hundreds of pages of detailed specifications. 1
Each congressional committee should
be required, when drafting a regulatory
statute, to present estimates of the expected benefits and costs of the regulatory
program in the report accompanying the
legislation. The committee should affirm
that these benefits justify the program in
light of its estimated costs. Such a statement, and the benefit-cost analysis supporting it, should be required before a legislative proposal can be reported to the full
House or Senate.
In contrast, the way many regulatory
statutes are now written both requires the
agencies to ignore economic effects and
precludes them from even considering the
most cost-effective approaches. Key provisions of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Superfund Act have
been interpreted by the courts to prohibit
the regulators from taking account of economic impacts when setting standards.
Despite well-intended presidential directives, it is impossible for regulators to strike
any sensible balance between the costs
they impose and the benefits they generate when the basic regulatory laws prohibit
costs from being considered at all.
Congress should eliminate provisions
in existing regulatory statutes that prevent
or limit regulatory agencies from considering costs or comparing expected benefits
with costs when designing and promulgating regulations. Regulations that seek to
reduce health or safety risks should be
based on scientific risk-assessment and
should address risks that are real and significant rather than hypothetical or remote.
Confidence in benefit-cost analysis ofregu12

lations would be enhanced by use of a common set of assumptions and the requirement for peer review of the analyses. Moreover, major benefit-cost analyses should
undergo retrospective reviews and updates.8

Congress should eliminate
provisions in existing regulatory
statutes that prevent or limit
regulatory agencies from considering costs or comparing
expected benefits with costs
when designing and promulgating
regulations.

More fundamentally, all those involved
in the government's decision-making process should realize that identifying a worthy
objective does not necessarily create a need
for regulation. Government is already a very
substantial presence in the American
economy. Today's large federal establishment has great difficulty carrying out the
numerous responsibilities already assigned
to it. In contrast, the ability of competitive
markets to protect the public is very powerful and not fully appreciated. The burden
should be on those who would replace the
market with additional regulation to demonstrate with solid information and careful analysis that the public would benefit
from a further extension of government into
the private sector.
Small businesses are especially vulnerable to arbitrary actions by regulators. The
Wisconsin toy producer who went out of
business following an erroneous report by
the Consumer Product Safety Commission
is a classic example of a little firm unable
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to cope with large bureaucracy. The agency
refused to correct its error in a timely fashion even after acknowledging the mistakeand the company lost much of its sales as
a result.

A key barrier to reforming
regulation is the common and
erroneous perception that the
costs of government regulation
are of little concern to citizens
because they are simply paid by
business.

Often officials lack the authority to correct an error quickly, even when they want
to do so. For example, the EPA admitted it
erred in listing the household antibiotic
Bacitracin as an "extremely hazardous"
substance. However, the agency was precluded from deleting that erroneous listing without going through the same burdensome process that it does in newly listing a very hazardous product. 9
A key barrier to reforming regulation is
the common and erroneous perception that
the costs of govemment regulation are of
little concern to citizens because they are
simply paid by business. That is not so.
By and large, those costs are ultimately
bome by the workers and consumers who
make and purchase products and services
produced under regulation. Moreover,
much of the rule making extends to all
employers, be they profit or nonprofit, in
the public sector or in the private sector.
The American people deserve better
results from the substantial resources devoted to regulation. Too many of these

14

regulations have been grossly inefficient,
causing us to waste scarce resources in
the pursuit of trivial or imaginary improvements in human health protection and
environmental quality. Gains in these areas may be possible, but we will obtain
them only by chance if we continue present
practices. If we are truly serious about
achieving cleaner air and water, safer workplaces and residences, and better living
standards, especially for the poor, then a
vibrant and relentless program of independent regulatory analysis and oversight will
be necessary along with institutional
changes that discourage old, discredited
ways of legislating and regulating. The reforms proposed in this report are not
merely matters of procedure and economic
accounting. By enhancing the accountability of our legislators and regulators, they
would improve the lives of the American
people.
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